OPINION: From the horse’s mouth - biosecurity lessons from equine influenza
by Graeme Mickelberg
Last year’s outbreak of equine influenza, and the subsequent Inquiry, have biosecurity implications beyond the horse-racing industry, as Graeme Mickelberg writes.
In August 2007 the Australian thoroughbred horse industry was struck by equine influenza.
The outbreak commenced in New South Wales and spread to Queensland and although no infected horses were reported in the other States and Territories, stringent controls were imposed which placed limits on the movement of horses.
The horse-racing industry also suffered significant financial losses and other supporting businesses were also affected.
As a result of the outbreak the Federal Government commissioned the Equine Influenza Inquiry.
The terms of reference were specifically focused on the importation of horses into Australia and the Inquiry was tasked to examine the circumstances of the outbreak and the need for strengthened biosecurity measures for the quarantine management of imported horses.
The Equine Influenza Inquiry identified serious shortcomings in policies and procedures relating to the management of quarantine arrangements for imported horses as well as limitations in the effectiveness of regulatory Agencies charged with the responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity.
The relevance of the outcomes and recommendations of the Inquiry are not restricted to the thoroughbred horse breeding and racing industries and should be viewed more broadly in the context of a wide range of other industries and organisations.
The equine influenza outbreak, its impacts and the approach taken by the Authorities to responding to the outbreak provide a valuable insight to other biosecurity challenges that may confront Governments.
Such challenges include dealing with threats associated with bio-terrorism.
Australia has thankfully not experienced bio-terrorism yet the potential exists for terrorists to harness biological weapons.
Depending on the intent of such an attack the impacts would be catastrophic extending to social, economic, health and environmental impacts.
An insight to the potential costs of a biosecurity incident was provided by research conducted by the Productivity Commission in 2002, which examined impacts that may result from an outbreak of foot and mouth disease.
Costs resulting from an outbreak of foot and mouth disease were estimated at between AUD$3B and AUD$13B.
The Equine Influenza Inquiry also provided an insight to the demands experienced by Government Agencies with responsibility to manage biosecurity.
The observations made were not flattering and painted a picture of organisations and senior managers that were ill-equipped to meet the demands of responding to a biosecurity incident in a timely and efficient way.
It was apparent the responsible Agencies did not communicate effectively and that coordination between the relevant Agencies was ineffective.
Facilitating a multi-Agency response, particularly where more than one jurisdiction is involved, requires clear and unambiguous polices and protocols as well as common operating procedures, management structures and standardised training for people responsible for managing the detection, response to and recovery from biosecurity threats.
The Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), which provides a range of technical response plans developed to facilitate a joint national response to an animal disease outbreak, was not addressed by the Equine Influenza Inquiry.
The Inquiry did however address the failure by responsible Agencies to communicate with each other and the adverse affects of organisations operating in isolation with ill conceived management structures and policies.
The nature of Australia’s federation is such that coordination between the jurisdictions and amongst Agencies in each of the States and Territories is a fundamental requirement to the effective detection, response and recovery from biosecurity threats.
Experience gained by other countries also provides a valuable insight. The observations of Commissions that examined the response to the 9/11 attacks in the US and Hurricane Katrina identified the critical importance of organisations sharing information with each other and the need for a unified and coordinated approach.
Coordination may be fostered by ensuring interoperability between Agencies which is facilitated by:
• Clear and unambiguous policies and management protocols.
• Standing operational procedures for surveillance, response and recovery.
• Information sharing.
• Common training.
The equine influenza outbreak resulted in many negative outcomes however the lessons learnt from the outbreak should be viewed in the context of other biosecurity contingencies, including bio-terrorism, as they provide an insight to strategies that may have relevance to other biosecurity threats confronted by Australia in the future.
First published in ASM September-October 2008
About the author: Graeme Mickelberg is a security risk consultant. His business, Hydra Enterprises Pty Ltd, has national and international clients in the private and public sectors. Graeme can be contacted by email at hydraenterprises@telstra.com or on 0407 113 909.