Nuclear security case study: earthquake in Sichuan Province, China
One of the factors resulting from the recent earthquake in Western China was the presence of radioactivity in the disaster area. Geoff Swan, of the Security Research Centre at Edith Cowan University, considers the specific importance of nuclear security.
Just after lunchtime on Monday 12 May 2008, an earthquake measuring 7.9 on the Richter scale hit the mountainous Sichuan Province in Western China.
The structural devastation was widespread, with whole buildings and other structures collapsing, including thousands of schools and hospitals.
Numerous aftershocks, mudslides and the possibility of severe flooding added to the misery of the inhabitants.
By the end of May the death toll was believed to be over 70,000 with millions displaced.
The security of nuclear materials has been one of many concerns in the days and weeks following the earthquake.
Although there are no nuclear power stations in Sichuan province, it has a significant military nuclear presence including nuclear reactors.
The cities of Mianyang and Guangyuan host a nuclear weapons design facility and a plutonium processing facility respectively, as part of a network of secretive facilities in Sichuan Province that are believed to include the storage of nuclear weapons in the mountains.
However, these sites are highly strategic with maximum security and contingency plans in a known quake area and would have been secured in the days following the earthquake.
Of more concern were the risks posed by the earthquake with respect to the security of civilian radioactive sources and corresponding public statements by the Chinese vice-environment minister.
Radioactive sources are relatively common in hospitals, industry, and research around the world with some sources being highly radioactive.
For example, all capital cities and many regional centres in Australia have radiotherapy units within hospitals where intense radiation is used to treat cancer.
On Friday 23 May, Chinese vice environment minister Wu Xiaoqing announced that the government had located 50 radioactive sources from the disaster area with 35 sources already recovered.
Of the 15 un-recovered sources, 12 were in buildings that were too dangerous for people to enter, and 3 were buried under the rubble.
There was no comment on whether there were other un-located sources.
In addition, it was widely reported that the vice environment minister was insistent that the situation was under control.
The meaning of “under control” is debatable.
Would any government spokesperson say otherwise, given the overriding concerns of national security, public order and safety?
Many in the general public would not consider a situation with 15 unrecovered radioactive sources as being anywhere near under control, or indeed possible to be under control.
Control might only be achieved when the sources had been safely recovered and the level of risk commensurate with the pre-earthquake levels.
An evaluation of any situation will not only be based on one’s knowledge of the situation, but also depend on one’s perspective.
From a security perspective, “under control” would relate to a risk assessment exercise, where significant risks have been identified, analysed, and evaluated, followed by treatment to eliminate, retain or mitigate risks to an acceptably low level as part of a comprehensive risk management plan.
There are three general risks for radioactive sources in this situation that could result in the loss of a source and/or subsequent breach of containment and dispersal of radioactive material.
The first risk is from natural acts.
The good news is that there have been no leakages detected or lost sources reported following the earthquake.
Unusual radioactivity has not been detected with local measurements at any of the affected sites or by any of the international radionuclide stations that are sensitive to trace amounts of radioactive gases in the atmosphere and form part of the global monitoring mission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).
So this risk might be considered to be low.
The bad news is that this situation could change with repeated aftershocks, mudslides and possible flooding from newly created lakes which could burst their banks.
The second risk is through accidental human intervention.
Radioactive sources could be taken and damaged through scavenging or curiosity with the accidental or unintentional release of harmful radiation.
Even if the likelihood is considered very low, this risk cannot be discounted as the consequences can be quite severe.
This is best illustrated by the Goiania incident in Brazil in 1987 where a single 1375 Curie cesium-137 radioactive source was scavenged for the metal housing from an abandoned hospital radiotherapy clinic. Curiosity helped the powder, which was not recognised as being radioactive, to disperse widely over a period of weeks.
The human toll from this one incident was 5 people dead, 249 people found to be contaminated, and 112,000 people monitored for radiation exposure and sickness.
The third risk is theft and release of radiation for the purposes of terrorism and/or extortion.
The autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet in the far west of China both contain significant rebellions of concern to the central Chinese government.
Although Tibet borders Sichuan, it is ethnic Uighur separatists in Xinjiang who may be most amenable to the Al-Qaeda message of extreme terrorism.
In April this year, 45 Uighurs were arrested and accused of plotting terrorist attacks on the Beijing Olympic Games to further their cause for an independent and Muslim East Turkestan.
To take advantage of the earthquake in Sichuan to steal and disperse radioactive material would likely require a high level of organisation, resources and desire that has not been witnessed in China to date.
The widespread use of highly radioactive isotopes in Australia and possible severe consequences of radioactive release means that we should learn from the Chinese experience and update our contingency plans.
About the author: Geoff Swan is a senior lecturer and physicist in the Security Research Centre at Edith Cowan University. For more information, visit www.secau.scis.ecu.edu.au