Civilian departments 'under resourced' and 'under prepared' for national security roles
by Ernie Davitt, National Affairs Editor, ASM
The Federal Government is still digesting the thrust of a recent report which says that compared with Defence, the civilian departments involved in national security are under-resourced and administratively under-prepared for the roles that they are now expected to perform.
The Government is also looking at comments by a number of other leading national security specialists and academics supporting the concept of providing more resources for the non-Defence agencies involved in national security.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI’s) Dr Carl Ungerer makes his claims about under-resourcing in a recent paper calling for major changes to strengthen Australia’s national security management.
These include creation of a new ministry responsible for overseeing national security issues and the setting up of a National Security Council which can operate independently of policy agencies and the intelligence community.
The new council would replace the existing Secretaries Committee on National Security as well as the National Intelligence Coordination Committee.
Dr Ungerer’s views on under-resourcing have been somewhat supported by former Army Chief and current head of the Australian National University’s National Security Institute, Professor Peter Leahy.
Prof Leahy says Australia does not need the numbers of high-intensity military capabilities currently planned under the 2009 Defence White Paper.
He argues that Australia’s overall security can be further enhanced by bolstering the country’s broader civilian, domestic and international diplomatic aid and security efforts.
ASM reported in 2010 that the national security community has been under increasing criticism for being too ‘stovepiped’ in its approach, with accusations of tribalism, lack of cohesion and for making decisions on expenditure which suited individual agencies and not necessarily the national interest. Defence was named as one of the worst offenders.
Dr Ungerer, who is ASPI’s Program Director for its National Security Program, says in his paper, entitled National Security Institutions: Reforms and Renewal, that despite government rhetoric about the shifting nature of security problems towards non-military threats, the Department of Defence continues to receive the lion’s share of the national security dollar – over six times the $4.3 billion for the civilian agencies.
“In relative terms, the civilian departments are under-resourced and administratively under-prepared for the national security roles that they are now expected to perform,” he says.
National security management should be in the hands of a Special Minister of State reporting to the Prime Minister, Dr Ungerer says. The new minister would be responsible for coordinating security issues across portfolios.
“Given the growth in the size of the national security community, and the complexity of issues confronting it, having a dedicated minister to provide oversight and accountability is both necessary and overdue.”
This would help drag the security community out of its 1940s framework and into the 21st century.
Issues once on the periphery of international affairs – climate change, emergency management and energy security – have crowded the security agenda, making it hard for agencies to prioritise.
“Despite a decade of reform and large funding increases, Australia’s national security architecture remains similar to its original design in the 1940s,” Dr Ungerer says.
Prof Leahy says that even as Indonesia recedes as a ‘threat’ there remains a continued focus on high-intensity, high-cost military equipment for the defence of Australia.
“Australia needs capabilities of this type to counter the least likely but most dangerous defence contingency – a conventional military attack against the mainland of Australia,” he said in a recent article.
“These capabilities are also needed to make a credible contribution to coalition operations where Australia’s interests are threatened.
“However, Australia does not need the numbers of high-intensity capabilities currently planned under the 2009 Defence White Paper. The money could be better spent ensuring that those elements of the Australian Defence Force involved in the current fight and most likely future fights are properly resourced and structured.
“Australia’s overall security can be further enhanced by bolstering the country’s broader civilian, domestic and international diplomatic aid and security efforts.”
Prof Leahy said the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was ‘chronically short of finances’, the International Deployment Group of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) had yet to achieve full operational capability, and the problem of refugee flows had yet to be resolved. AusAID was building capability through planned funding increases, but had yet to translate this to a credible deployable civil effort on the ground.
In his paper, Dr Ungerer identified three broad recommendations for building a more integrated policy framework:
- making networks the main institutional design feature, not departments;
- placing the functions of the National Security Advisor on a statutory basis; and
- appointing a Special Minister of State for national security.
“These reforms are neither complicated, technically difficult nor resource intensive,” he said.
Dr Ungerer, whose career includes a period as a senior strategic analyst in the Office of National Assessments (ONA), says that under his model, the ministers for Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General would retain ministerial responsibility for operational matters within their respective portfolios.
“But the Special Minister would have responsibility for setting priorities, strategies and direction. In addition to incorporating the functions of the new National Security Council, the Special Minister would have responsibility for the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security and the Office of National Assessments.
“There is also merit in considering whether the functions of domestic security intelligence should also be incorporated within the Special Minister’s portfolio. The main advantage here is that it would bring priority setting for both foreign and domestic intelligence into closer alignment.
“Most importantly, the Special Minister of State should have responsibility for making recommendations to the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) on resource allocations between agencies based on a national risk assessment as part of the annual national security budget cycle and responsibility for reporting on the performance of subordinate agencies.
“What is required for greater institutional integration and coherence among the agencies of the national security community is leadership – to overcome entrenched bureaucratic bottlenecks and the existence of unnecessary silos.
“Some of that leadership will come from within the bureaucracy. But the more important element of national security planning will rest with executive government and what priorities it has for Australia’s security.”
In his paper, Dr Ungerer examines the recent evolution of Australia’s national security institutions and puts the case for homeland security, border protection and defence agencies to integrate and network.
The paper highlights the major changes to Australia’s national security institutions since 2008 including the shifting conceptual foundations for policy making, new power structures and changes to the way in which national security institutions are funded and organised.
It argues that despite several years of reform, the institutional design for national security policy-making as a whole remains dominated by centralisation and limited coordination.
Dr Ungerer argues that “a more appropriate model for Australia’s national security would better align strategy, resources and administrative functions”.
“Over the next decade, Australia will confront an international security environment that will be more competitive and less amenable to a ‘business as usual’ approach,” he said.
Recent reforms had encompassed several important changes to the way in which Australia conducted its national security policy.
These changes included:
- a conceptual shift (expanding the definition of national security threats to include ‘all hazards’ and applying risk-based methodologies to national security planning);
- constitutive changes (affecting both the size of the national security institutions and their legislative foundations); and
- distributive effects (influencing the distribution of power, resources and influence among and between agencies).
Today, national security is closer to the centre of public administration than at any time since World War II. In light of these reforms, Dr Ungerer’s paper asks three basic questions:
- what is driving these changes in our national security institutions?
- what institutional changes have been put in place?
- what further institutional reforms may be necessary to meet the national security challenges of the future?
At the core of Australia’s national security institutions are the four pillars of diplomacy, defence, domestic security and intelligence. The foundations of these institutions can be traced back to the time of Federation in 1901.
Dr Ungerer said that, in general, analysts had put forward four main reasons why the existing institutional frameworks were no longer sufficient to manage the complexity of the modern global security environment.
“First, the pace and interconnectedness of national security threats have changed as a result of globalisation. Although the threat of state-based, conventional military conflict remains low, threats from transnational non-state actors have increased. Borders are no longer effective barriers to the movement of people, drugs, weapons or disease,” he said.
“Ideologies of hatred and extremism find new audiences around the world and at home with the spread of the internet and modern communications technology. Smaller groupings, including terrorist networks and in some cases organised criminal gangs, have acquired weapons, motivations and organisational forms that resemble low-level military capabilities.
“Second, the agenda of national security encompasses a range of risks and pressures in the international system that cannot be solved by one agency or one tier of government acting alone.
“In an all-hazards environment, the range and diversity of national security threats – from bushfires to ballistic missiles – compels governments to find common security approaches between agencies and between states.
“Third, the national security institutions that were designed to respond to the relatively predictable patterns of the Cold War now seem slow and cumbersome in the face of these new security challenges.
“Large departments of state are often inward-looking and fail to adapt quickly to changes in the external security environment.
“In particular, the institutional lines of responsibility which continue to define hard barriers between foreign and domestic security policy appear anachronistic. Allan Gyngell, Director General of ONA, neatly summarises this shift, noting that ‘the barriers between the domestic and the foreign have blurred and faded’.
“Fourth, analysts have noted that there is a growing division between the funding for civilian and military instruments of national security policy. Despite government rhetoric about the shifting nature of security problems towards non-military threats, the Department of Defence continues to receive the lion’s share of the national security dollar —$27 billion a year compared to around $4.3 billion for the civilian agencies.”
This article first appeared in Australian Security Magazine (ASM), Jan-Feb 2011 edition.